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Abstract
In this paper we present a slotted packet counting
attack against anonymity protocols. Common packet
counting attacks make strong assumptions on the set-
up and can easily lead to wrong conclusions, as we
will show in our work. To overcome these limitations,
we account for the variation of traﬃc load over time.
We use correlation to express the relation between
sender and receiver nodes. Our attack is applicable
to many anonymity protocols. It assumes a passive
attacker and works with partial knowledge of the net-
work traﬃc.
Keywords: Anonymity, Unlinkability, Traﬃc Analy-
sis, Packet Counting.
1 Introduction
Privacy protection and anonymity in the Internet at-
tract more and more attention because of the pub-
lic discussion on the storage of personal information
by many service providers. At the moment there ex-
ist several protocols for anonymous communication in
the Internet that are ready to use, such as Tor (Din-
gledine et al. 2004) and JAP (Berthold et al. 2000).
These protocols share a common idea: The traﬃc is
sent over a cascade of so called onion routers (or
mixes respectively), which obfuscate the routes the
packets will take and so make it hard for an attacker
to trace the route of a certain packet. But although
an attacker both cannot easily trace a packet and can-
not extract any information about the communication
partners from the content of the packet, he still can
perform attacks on these protocols, e.g. by means of
traﬃc analysis.
In this paper we present a traﬃc analysis attack
which is a further development of the idea of packet
counting. The ﬁrst packet counting attacks were pro-
posed in (Back et al. 2001, Raymond 2001). In their
attacks, a passive attacker counts the packets entering
and leaving a mix on diﬀerent links; the attacker then
tries to ﬁnd coherences in the number of packets en-
tering on an input link and a similar number of pack-
ets leaving on an output link. To some extent, this
enables an attacker to trace packets. However, as Ser-
jantov and Sewell (Serjantov & Sewell 2003) pointed
out, this attack is restricted to scenarios where it can
be assumed that connections that enter and leave an
anonymity system are lone, i.e. two connections going
into an anonymity system never leave the system on
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a shared link and vice versa. Because of this strong
assumption the attack is not applicable in most set-
tings.
In our work, we present a packet counting attack
that does not require this assumption. In our sce-
nario, an attacker ﬁrst counts packets sent and re-
ceived by the users of an anonymity system in dif-
ferent time slots. Then the attacker identiﬁes for
sender/receiver-pairs the correlation of changes in
traﬃc load over time; in this manner, he can proba-
bilistically reveal communication links. The only as-
sumption we need to make is that the attacker can
count the respective numbers of sent and received
packets that enter and leave an anonymity system
(as is also required for common packet counting).
An application of such an attack might be crime
prevention and detection. Using this attack it is pos-
sible to link the IP addresses of the communication
partners. With a directive of the European Union
(EU Commission 2006), that demands the logging
of electronic communication within the EU member
states as from 2009, it also becomes possible to map
the IP addresses to the identities of the users.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows.
In Section 3 we give an overview of existing anonymity
protocols and known attacks on these protocols. In
Section 4 we show that packet counting as described
in (Back et al. 2001) and (Raymond 2001) is not very
eﬀective and explain why this is the case. We present
an improved slotted packet counting attack in Section
5 and apply it to real network traﬃc traces in Section
6. Section 7 gives an overview on related work and
Section 8 concludes the work and points out future
work.
2 Attacker Model
In this paper we assume that the attacker passively
observes the network communication. This means
that the attacker knows who sends packets and who
receives packets at any time. This is a widely used
attacker model for the evaluation of traﬃc analysis
attacks (see e.g. (Serjantov & Sewell 2003, Danezis
et al. 2007)). For the analysis of the attacks we are
only interested in the packets entering and leaving an
anonymity system. In Section 6.3 we show the im-
pact of a weaker attacker model on our attack, where
the attacker only has partial knowledge of the traﬃc
entering and leaving an anonymity system.
Furthermore we assume that the attacker cannot
break the anonymity systems and all used crypto-
graphic functions. This includes that the attacker
cannot take over the anonymity system or any part of
it. Because we do not concentrate on one anonymity
system, the attacker does not use any vulnerability of
one speciﬁc anonymity system. We only assume that
the attacker observes an anonymity system that oﬀers
unlinkability without sender and receiver anonymity.
By this he tries to link the sender and receiver nodes.
We give details on protocols that match these assump-
tions in Section 3.1.
3 Background
We use this section to give a short introduction on
related work in the area of anonymity. First, we in-
troduce the concept of anonymity and show how it
can be implemented for network communication. Sec-
ondly we give an overview on traﬃc analysis attacks
that assume a passive attacker as introduced in Sec-
tion 2.
3.1 Anonymity Protocols
There are many protocols that try to oﬀer anonymity
to their users. Before going into these protocols, we
need to deﬁne what anonymity means. To this end,
we give the widely accepted deﬁnition of anonymity
by Pﬁtzmann (see (Pﬁtzmann & Köhntopp 2000)):
Anonymity of a subject means that the
subject is not identiﬁable within a set of sub-
jects, the anonymity set.
Out of this deﬁnition, the main functionality of
anonymity protocols should be: First, try to make
the anonymity set as big as possible and second, try
to make the subjects as unidentiﬁable as possible. In
the best case the probability for having performed an
action, from the attackers perspective, is the same
for all subjects.In the case of network communication
there is a specialization in sender anonymity, where
the sender belongs to the sender anonymity set, and
receiver anonymity, where the receiver belongs to the
receiver anonymity set. Unlinkability means that the
attacker cannot link the sender and the receiver of a
communication. This is the case when a protocol of-
fers either sender anonymity, or receiver anonymity,
or both, sender and receiver anonymity, or it just
makes the mapping of sent and received packets im-
possible. More details on the deﬁnitions of terms in
the context of anonymity can be found in (Pﬁtzmann
& Köhntopp 2000).
The ﬁrst category of anonymity protocols bases on
the only protocol that oﬀers provable anonymity, the
dining cryptographers network (Chaum 1981). The
protocol oﬀers sender anonymity, receiver anonymity
and therefore also unlinkability of sender and receiver.
The main disadvantage of this approach is the com-
munication overhead produced. The idea of this pro-
tocol is used in CliqueNet (see (Sirer et al. 2001)),
Herbivore (see (Goel et al. 2003)) and Acimn (see
(Fusenig et al. 2008)).
The second category of anonymity protocols
only oﬀers unlinkability without sender and receiver
anonymity. This means that the attacker can observe
when a node is sending packets and also when a node
is receiving packets. To this class of protocols belong
mixes (see (Chaum 1981)) and its advancements by
(Danezis et al. 2003, Reiter & Rubin 1998, Shields
& Levine 2000, Berthold et al. 2000), as well as Tor,
the Second Generation Onion Router which bases on
Onion Routing (see (Goldschlag et al. 1996, Syverson
et al. 2000, Dingledine et al. 2004)), and also the fol-
lowing protocols for anonymous communication in ad
hoc networks: ANODR (Kong & Hong 2003), Mask
(Zhang et al. 2006), Odar (Sy et al. 2006), and ARM
(Seys & Preneel 2006). All the protocols of this sec-
ond category are vulnerable to our attack that is pre-
sented in Section 5.
In the rest of the paper we abstract from the con-
crete protocol. Instead we use the term anonymity
system, which refers to an anonymity protocol of the
second category.
3.2 Traﬃc Analysis Attacks
The most powerful attacks on anonymity systems are
traﬃc analysis attacks. In this kind of attack the at-
tacker observes the network traﬃc of the anonymity
system and its users in order to detect communica-
tion partners. An attacker can do this passively by
just observing, but can also actively induce situations
where traﬃc analysis is much easier.
In Section 2, we restrict ourselves to attackers that
passively observe the network traﬃc. For this reason,
we give an overview on traﬃc analysis attacks for pas-
sive attackers.
Message Coding Attack By looking at the coding
or content of a message, the attacker might get
information on the sender or receiver. For ex-
ample, in some anonymity protocols the mes-
sages do not change the appearance when enter-
ing and leaving the anonymity system (i.e. (Kong
& Hong 2003)). In this case the attacker can just
map the identical packets.
Timing Attack The attacker measures the latency
of the reply of a packet. By knowing this, he tries
to ﬁnd the communication partner with the help
of a list with known latencies. This technique can
also be used for geolocating nodes in the internet
(see (Huﬀmann & Reifer 2005)).
Communication Pattern Attack
Because network communication is not
random, the attacker can try to identify
communication patterns at sender and receiver
side.
Intersection Attack For this attack it is assumed
that the users of a network usually communicate
with the same communication partners more fre-
quently. By observing the network for a longer
time period, the attacker can intersect the set of
active users at the diﬀerent points in time.
Packet Volume Attack If the anonymity system
allows packets of diﬀerent size, the attacker can
downsize the set of possible receivers of a packet
to these nodes which received a packet with the
same size.
Packet Counting Attack While counting packets
sent and received by the users of an anonymity
system, the attacker might link communication
partners.
The above attacks show that an attacker has a
chance to ﬁnd communication partners even if they
use an anonymity system. Because our attack bases
on the concept of packet counting attacks, we give a
deeper analysis of this attack in Section 4.
4 Packet Counting Attacks
In this section we show that common packet counting
attacks, as introduced in recent literature, are not ef-
ﬁcient when a passive attacker as described in Section
2 is assumed.
The idea of packet counting attacks, as in the lit-
erature (see (Back et al. 2001, Raymond 2001, Serjan-
tov & Sewell 2003)), is that the attacker can observe
the sending and receiving of packets. The attacker
counts these sending and receiving events and tries to
ﬁnd similarities in order to derive plausible pairs of
communication partners. These approaches assume
Figure 1: Example: Packet Counting
Table 1: Communication partners
S1 S2 S3 S4 S5
R1 0 0 25 0 0
R2 32 0 0 31 0
R3 0 3 0 0 0
R4 5 15 0 0 56
R5 2 0 5 0 0
that a relation between the similarity of the number
of sending and receiving events and the probability
for the associated communication link exists.
Assume that the attacker has no further infor-
mation except the number of packets sent by some
sender nodes S1, · · · , Sn and received by receiver
nodes R1, · · · , Rm. Then, the probability that a node
Si sent a packet to node Rj actually does not depend
on how similar the number of sent packets by Si and
received packets at Rj are. The only thing one can
say is that the probability becomes higher the more
packets Si sends and the more packets Rj receives
while at the same time the number of sender and re-
ceiver nodes stays constant. This becomes clear when
looking at the following example. Figure 1 shows an
anonymity system with sender nodes S1, · · · , S5 and
receiver nodes R1, · · · , R5 as it is seen by an attacker.
For evaluation of attacks we show the same setting in
Table 1 where additionally the communication part-
ners with the corresponding number of packets are
given. Now, assuming that we have no further infor-
mation except the given number of packets sent and
received as in Fig. 1, we can compute the probabilities
for every node Si communicating with Rj as relative
frequencies. We write p(Si) to denote the number of
packets that node Si sends, and p(Rj) for the number
of packets received by node Rj respectively. We de-
note the number of all receiver nodes by n. The nodes
Rk, 1 ≤ k ≤ n receive together
∑n
k=1 p(Rk) packets,
and Rk, 1 ≤ k ≤ n, k 6= j receive together
∑n
k=1
k 6=j
p(Rk)
packets. With this information we can calculate the
probability of Si having sent a packet to Rj by:
P (Si sent to Rj) = 1−
(∑n
k=1
k 6=j
p(Rk)
p(Si)
)
(∑n
k=1 p(Rk)
p(Si)
) . (1)
The resulting probabilities when using the values
of Fig. 1 are shown in Table 2. The table shows that
the more packets are sent by a node Si and the more
packets are received by a node Rj the higher is the
probability that at least one packet was send by Si to
Rj . Hence, a correlation of sender nodes and receiver
nodes by only counting packets is not very eﬀective.
This negative eﬀect is also experienced in existing
Table 2: Likelihood for communication
S1 S2 S3 S4 S5
R1 0.999 0.948 0.994 0.995 1.000
R2 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000
R3 0.535 0.281 0.435 0.447 0.691
R4 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000
R5 0.837 0.541 0.741 0.753 0.938
literature. Raymond (Raymond 2001) says that only
if one node sends an unusual number of packets, the
attacker can ﬁnd the receiver of this unusual number
of packets. Serjantov and Sewell (Serjantov & Sewell
2003) stress that packet counting only works if the
whole connection is lone. This means that several
connections using an anonymity system at the same
time, neither share incoming links nor outgoing links
of the system, i.e. the number of packets counted for
an incoming or outgoing link can be related to one
unique connection. Aside from the fact that this is
a strong assumption, it is not always possible for the
attacker to ﬁnd out whether a connection is lone or
not.
5 Slotted Packet Counting
As seen in the previous Section 4 we do not obtain
enough information to correlate sender nodes to re-
ceiver nodes only by knowing the number of packets
sent and received by these nodes. In this section we
show how to improve this kind of attack by measuring
the alteration of sent and received packets over time.
5.1 Attack Details
We deﬁne time slots t1, · · · , tm and count the sent
and received packets at every node per time slot.
For every sender node Si we build a random variablePSiwith values pk(Si)(1 ≤ k ≤ m), giving the num-
ber of packets sent in time slot tk. In the same way
we have a random variable PRj with values pk(Rj)
(1 ≤ k ≤ m), representing the number of packets
received in time slot tk at node Rj .
To map the packets in time slot tk at the sender
side to packets at receiver side the attacker has to
be aware of timing. Because packets need some time
to pass the anonymity system he must shift the time
slot tk at the receiver side by this delay. How to
determine the size of the delay is not part of this
work. More information on this topic can be found in
(Levine et al. 2004).
Now we can calculate the correlation coeﬃcient of
the random variables of the sender nodes to the ran-
dom variables of the receiver nodes in order to map
them together (for details on probability theory see
i.e. (Bain & Engelhardt 2000)). The correlation co-
eﬃcient of two random variables gives the strength
and direction of their linear relationship. Its value is
in the interval [−1, 1], where 0 stands for not correlat-
ing variables, 1 and −1 for correlating variables. We
are only interested in the cases where the correlation
coeﬃcient is near to 1 what means that the random
variables have a positive linear relationship. These
are the cases where it is highly probable that the
corresponding nodes communicated with each other.
The correlation coeﬃcient of two random variables X
and Y is calculated as follows:
ρX,Y =
cov(X,Y )
σxσy
=
E((X − µX)(Y − µY ))
σxσy
. (2)
In order to calculate the correlation coeﬃcient of
two random variables PSi and PRj , we need the re-
lated expectation values µSi and µRj as well as the
Table 3: Packet count for sending per time slot
t1 t2 t3 t4 t5
S1 7 3 14 6 9
S2 3 3 7 3 2
S3 7 11 3 7 2
S4 3 8 6 2 12
S5 8 12 4 20 12
Table 4: Packet count for receiving per time slot
t1 t2 t3 t4 t5
R1 6 9 1 7 2
R2 8 11 18 5 21
R3 3 0 0 0 0
R4 8 15 13 26 14
R5 3 2 2 0 0
standard deviations σSi and σRj . We assume that the
random variables PSi and PRj are normal distributed
and justify this with the central limit theorem (see
(Bain & Engelhardt 2000)). With this we can calcu-
late the expectation value µSi as follows:
µSi =
1
m
m∑
k=1
pk(Si) . (3)
Just as well we can compute the standard devia-
tion σSi by:
σSi =
√√√√ 1
m
m∑
k=1
(µSi − pk(Si))2 . (4)
Having calculated the expected values and stan-
dard deviations for all sender and receiver nodes we
can calculate the correlation between every pair of
sender Si and receiver Rj . We give an example for
the calculation in the following Section 5.2.
5.2 Example
We use the network and traﬃc of Fig. 1 (see Sec-
tion 4) but split the observations of the traﬃc in ﬁve
time slots t1, · · · , t5. Table 3 shows the slotted packet
count for sent packets by S1, · · · , S5; Table 4, respec-
tively, for received packets by R1, · · · , R5.
With these values we can calculate expectation
values and standard deviations of all combinations of
sender and receiver nodes using the formulas (3) and
(4). Table 5 shows the correlation coeﬃcients calcu-
lated with formula (2) of sender and receiver nodes.
Out of these values one can conclude that the nodes
S2 and R1, S1 and R3, S2 and R4, S4 and R5 commu-
nicated with high probability (bold entries in Table
5), which also agrees with the assumed communica-
tion pattern given in Table 1. The comparison with
the results of a normal packet counting in Table 2
clearly shows that taking the correlation into account
oﬀers much more precise results.
Table 5: Correlation coeﬃcients of sender and re-
ceiver nodes
S1 S2 S3 S4 S5
R1 -0.938 -0.492 0.961 -0.385 0.547
R2 0.623 0.252 -0.721 0.843 -0.536
R3 -0.109 -0.172 0.155 -0.444 -0.302
R4 -0.257 -0.147 0.147 -0.274 0.846
R5 0.018 0.363 0.362 -0.296 -0.704
Figure 2: Locating communication slots
6 Attack in Practice
We have already shown the basic concept of the slot-
ted packet counting attack. This section covers the
application of the attack in practice.
If an attacker wants to determine whether node S
communicated with node R, he has to apply the slot-
ted packed counting attack. The problem is that the
attacker has to ﬁnd the points in time when S com-
municates with R. For that the attacker measures
the packets sent at node S and received at node R
during the time period where he guesses a communi-
cation. He divides the observations in m > n time
slots of length s and scans these values. Therefore he
applies the slotted packet counting attack for all inter-
vals with the time slots ti to ti+n, 1 ≤ i ≤ m− n (see
Fig. 2). A correlation coeﬃcient near to one for any
of the intervals indicates that there was a communica-
tion with high probability. If there exists more than
one such interval, the probability that S sent packets
to R becomes higher.
The attacker has to specify the values for size of
time slots s and the number of time slots n ﬁrst. The
optimal values for s and n depend mainly on the com-
munication characteristics. Using longer time slots or
a higher number of time slots does not necessarily
mean that it is easier for an attacker to ﬁnd a corre-
lation. In the optimal case, the duration s · n of the
observation is exactly as long as the communication
period of the two target nodes. If the observation
time becomes longer, the chance increases that the
sender node sends packets to diﬀerent receiver nodes
or that another sender node interferes at the receiver
side (more false negatives). A short observation in-
terval on the other hand makes it more likely that
correlations between sender and receiver nodes occur
even if there is no communication (more false posi-
tives). Details on the parameter will be speciﬁed in
the next section, when applying it to real network
traﬃc.
6.1 Setting
For deﬁning the parameters for the attack we ap-
ply it to captured network traﬃc traces. We use the
LBL-PKT-5 traﬃc traces (Paxson & Floyd 1994) of
TCP traﬃc. The traﬃc was captured at the Lawrence
Berkely Laboratory from 14:00 to 15:00 on January
28, 1994. We assume two scenarios where we want to
measure the correlation coeﬃcient: In the ﬁrst sce-
nario we assume amix with diﬀerent numbers of input
and output links, where one slot refers to one com-
munication round. In the second scenario we assume
a low latency anonymity protocol, such as Tor, where
we deﬁne communication slots by time intervals.
We execute the attack with diﬀerent parameters:
Threshold The threshold for the correlation coef-
ﬁcient. Above this threshold the algorithm as-
sumes a communication link. We vary this pa-
rameter in the interval from 0.90 to 0.99.
Number of slots We vary the number of slots
which are used for the measurement of the cor-
relation coeﬃcient from 3 up to 500.
Size of slots For the mix scenario we use slots of
size 5 up to 455 and for the Tor scenario we use
slots of size from 1 sec to 5 sec.
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Figure 3: F-Measure of Mix scenario
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Figure 4: F-Measure of Tor scenario
For evaluation we start the algorithm with diﬀer-
ent input traces and every possible combination of
parameters and use the mean of the diﬀerent runs.
The results of the measurement are discussed in the
following section.
6.2 Identifying parameters
We use the F-Measure (Rijsbergen 1979) to iden-
tify optimal values for the size and the number of
slots used for the measurement. The value of the F-
Measure is in the intervall (0, 1], wherein higher values
are better. With the F-Measure we want to ﬁnd val-
ues for the parameters that oﬀer a trade-oﬀ between
the false positives that occur with higher probability
when only few slots are used for the measurements
and the false negatives. The reason for false nega-
tives is mainly interferences with other communica-
tions, i.e. change in communication links or nodes
communicating with more than one node, which can
be minimized by using a shorter period of time for
the measurement.
Figure 3 and 4 show that the value for the F-
Measure depends on the size and the number of the
communication slots. In both examples we ﬁxed the
threshold for the correlation coeﬃcient to 0.95. In the
Mix scenario the F-Measure value reaches its maxi-
mum for 90 slots for a Mix with 5 incoming and out-
going links and around 10 slots for a Mix with links
between 50 and 500. We reached the best results for
the Tor scenario at a slot size of 0.5 seconds and 13
slots. The F-Measure value becomes smaller when we
increase the size of the slots, where the optimum for
the number of measured slots stays in the region of
13 slots.
Figure 5 gives an example where more communi-
cation slots used for measuring the correlation coef-
ﬁcient does not lead to a better correlation. In the
example a ﬁxed node Si sends packets to a ﬁxed node
Rj . At some point node Si changes its communication
partner to node Rk which results in a decreasing cor-
relation coeﬃcient of the sending and receiving events
of Si and Rj .
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Figure 5: Correlation coeﬃcient of nodes Si and Rj
6.3 Discussion
The application of the slotted packet counting attack
to real network traﬃc traces shows the practicability
of the attack. We showed how to adjust the param-
eters of the attack in order to improve the output of
the attack. Further improvements in the parameters
can be made: It might be better to use diﬀerent pa-
rameters for diﬀerent communication settings. For
example visiting a web site in the internet produces a
diﬀerent number of packets than a VoIP phone call.
For communication settings where a lot of traﬃc is
produced the attack will be more precise when using
more slots. The same number of slots oﬀers no use-
ful results for settings where only few packets over a
short period of time are sent.
The attack can fail in two ways as we have seen
in the previous section: In the ﬁrst case there is a
strong correlation between a sender node Si and a re-
ceiver node Rj while there was no communication be-
tween these nodes (false positive). One reason can be
that the measurement uses not enough information,
i.e. the covered period of time for the measurement
is too short. Another reason might be that the sets
of sender and receiver nodes are too big, which re-
sults in a higher chance of correlations of sender and
receiver nodes, where no communication takes place.
Hence, one mission to make this attack eﬀective is
to minimize the set of potential sender and receiver
nodes. By additionally using the timing of sending
and receiving events the set of potential sender and
receiver nodes can be reduced. By combining these
techniques we might gain better results for slotted
packet counting attacks.
The second way of failure is when there is no corre-
lation between nodes Si and Rj while these nodes are
communicating (false negative). As seen in the pre-
vious section this happens if there are interferences
by other nodes, i.e. there is a node Sk also sending
packets to Rj , so that the number of received packets
at Rj not only relates to the sending of Si. In this
case, the attacker can calculate the correlation of the
sum of packets counted at the sender nodes Si and
Sk with the packets counted at the receiver node Rj .
For performance reasons this grouping of sender and
receiver nodes should be limited to small groups.
Note that the problems addressed above also exist
in the packet counting attacks described in Section 4.
But slotted packet counting has the advantage that
false positives are less probable, because the packet
count has to be similar in every slot. Good results
can also be obtained by just observing the nodes of
interest because the correlation coeﬃcient only needs
the knowledge of the sending and receiving of these
nodes. Only for more complex attacks, as mentioned
before, more information is needed.
In general this attack is applicable to all
anonymity protocols where the attacker can detect
the sending and the receiving of packets. In more
speciﬁc settings where there is only a limited group
of users of the anonymity protocol (i.e. anonymity
protocols for ad hoc networks such as (Kong & Hong
2003), (Zhang et al. 2006) and (Seys & Preneel 2006))
the slotted packet counting attack is even more eﬀec-
tive. The only way to prevent any kind of packet
counting for this class of protocols is to use constant
link padding, which is not practicable in most settings
(see also (Raymond 2001)).
7 Related Work
Packet counting attacks were introduced in (Back
et al. 2001, Raymond 2001, Serjantov & Sewell 2003).
The attack described in these papers only take the
number of packets into account, which are measured
at the incoming and outgoing links of an anonymity
system. By comparing these numbers they try to de-
tect communication links. If a number of an incoming
link and one of an outgoing link are similar, then they
assume that these two links belong together. The
problem of this approach is, as seen before in Sec-
tion 4, that they assume lone connections, e.g. both
the links for incoming and outgoing packets are only
used for one communication. Even if this assumption
can be fulﬁlled it might be possible, that there ex-
ist similarities between incoming and outgoing links,
which do not belong together. Our slotted packet
counting does not need the strong constraint of lone
connections. Similarities between incoming and out-
going links are less probable, because they have to be
similar for several time slots in order that there is a
correlation.
A similar approach to slotted packet counting is
proposed by (Levine et al. 2004). They use cross
correlation to map input and output traﬃc of mixes
while we concentrate on the mapping of sender and
receiver devices. They show eﬀects of network pa-
rameters on the attack but do no optimization on the
attack parameters. We also give rules how to ﬁnd pa-
rameters for the attack in diﬀerent network settings.
Watermarking is used to ease traﬃc analysis. In
this case the attacker modiﬁes a traﬃc ﬂow so that it
contains a speciﬁc pattern. If this pattern is detected
at another position in the network, the two traﬃc
ﬂows are considered to be linked. Watermarking for
traﬃc analysis is used in (Wang & Reeves 2003, Wang
et al. 2007, Pyun et al. 2007). A defense to such an
attack is proposed in (Kiyavash et al. 2008), where a
method is introduced to detect and remove a water-
mark of a traﬃc ﬂow. The watermarking technique
might improve slotted packet counting in scenarios
with active attackers.
8 Conclusion and future work
We have presented a new traﬃc analysis attack which
is applicable to many anonymity systems. It consti-
tutes an improvement of the packet counting attack
because it does not require the strong assumption
of lone connections as stated in (Serjantov & Sewell
2003). We have shown by way of example and tests
on real network traﬃc traces that our slotted packet
counting attack can oﬀer useful results in cases where
the standard packet counting fails. The attack is ap-
plicable to all anonymity protocols which oﬀer unlink-
ability but no sender or receiver anonymity.
We have shown diﬀerent ideas of how to improve
slotted packet counting to gain better results in re-
alistic settings. Reducing the size of the anonymity
sets helps to improve the results. This can be done
by combining the slotted packet counting with timing
attacks.
Further improvements of the choice of the param-
eters can be made: By choosing diﬀerent parameters
for diﬀerent communication scenarios, e.g. VoIP com-
munication and Web surﬁng, the results of slotted
packet counting attacks can be optimized.
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